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In this paper, I offer an analysis of fake news— a notion that has entered public de-
bate following the 2016 US presidential election. On the view I defend, fake news is 
a variant of Frankfurtian bullshit, viz. bullshit asserted in the form of a news pub-
lication. Like the bullshitter, the publisher of fake news is indifferent to the truth 
and intends to cover up this indifference. At any rate, so I argue. To this end, I first 
introduce four test cases that a satisfactory analysis should match (Section 1), review 
some factors that might explain how fake news differs from related phenomena (Sec-
tion 2), and develop my analysis based on that review (Section 3). After that, I clarify 
the individual components of the account (Section 4) and discuss possible objections 
to my view (Section 5) before I conclude with a few thoughts on the practical prob-
lem that fake news poses.
An important way in which philosophy can contribute to public discourse  is by clarifying concepts that are central to it. This paper is a philosophical 
contribution in that spirit. It offers an account of fake news— a notion that has 
entered public debate following the 2016 US presidential election. On the view I 
defend, fake news is Frankfurtian bullshit that is asserted in the form of a news 
publication. According to Frankfurt’s famous account, bullshit has two charac-
teristics. There is, firstly, an “indifference to how things really are” (Frankfurt 
2005: 34) on the part of the bullshitter. This does not mean that what a bullshit-
ter says is always false. It might well be true. What it does mean, however, is 
that, unlike a liar, who tries to convince us that a given statement he believes to 
be false is true, a bullshitter simply does not care whether what he says is true. 
The same, I believe, is true of the publisher of fake news. Secondly, the bullshit-
ter misrepresents “in a certain way . . . what he is up to” (Frankfurt 2005: 54). 
Likewise, the publisher of fake news seems to misrepresent what he is up to. It 
appears that he wants to hide his actual motives. At any rate, so I will argue.
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The connection between Frankfurtian bullshit and fake news has, of course, 
been widely noted in the philosophical literature. However, no author has ex-
plicitly defended a conceptual analysis based on that idea. The purpose of this 
paper is to do just that. I believe that the analysis I offer covers all instances to 
which the label “fake news” is legitimately applied with the notable exception of 
one hypothetical case which I will discuss towards the end of the paper. To deal 
with this problematic case, I will suggest a distinction between two forms of fake 
news, viz. the bullshit type and the pure lying type. As I will explain, however, the 
pure lying type seems to be practically irrelevant, which is why I will propose 
to view fake news, for all practical purposes, as bullshit asserted in the form of 
a news publication.
My reasoning proceeds from the analysis of a series of cases, which I will 
introduce in Section 1. The first three are intuitively not cases of fake news, while 
the fourth one is. A correct analysis of the concept should, accordingly, exclude 
the first three while including the fourth. In Section 2, I go through some factors 
that could explain the difference between the first three cases and the fourth. In 
Section 3, I propose an analysis of fake news. On this analysis, fake news is a 
form of Frankfurtian bullshit. As I will show, this view matches our intuitions 
about the four test cases. After that, in Section 4, I go into some interpretive is-
sues to sharpen the account further. In Section 5, I consider two possible objec-
tions to my view, viz. that it is, respectively, overinclusive and overexclusive. On 
that basis, I conclude that a minor concession has to be made to account for the 
fact that there are conceivable cases of fake news that involve pure lying instead 
of Frankfurtian bullshit. I conclude, in the final section, with a summary of the 
reasoning and some suggestions for further research on the practical problem of 
fake news.
1. Test Cases
As a first step, I shall consider four cases and discuss whether, intuitively, the 
concept of fake news applies to them.
ACUPUNCTURE: In early 2006, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) 
featured a three- part series on alternative medicine. In one of the episodes, a 
medical team in Shanghai perform open- heart surgery on a 21- year- old woman 
who has opted to receive acupuncture in place of a general anaesthetic. While 
footage of the operation is being shown, the narrator explains that the young 
woman’s doctors have performed 300 similar operations. “What could possi-
bly explain what’s going on?”, she asks. Science journalist Simon Singh asked 
himself the same question and set out to investigate the case. As he found, the 
documentary did not make any false claims. The young woman did undergo 
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open- heart surgery, and she did receive acupuncture in place of an orthodox 
general anaesthetic. However, the documentary left out one crucial part of the 
story, viz. that the doctors gave their patient very powerful sedatives as well as 
local anaesthetics. Accordingly, Singh argued that the documentary created the 
false impression that acupuncture was able, by itself, to replace anaesthetics in 
surgical operations— a claim for which there is no evidence (Singh 2006).1
Intuitive Judgement: Intuitively, ACUPUNCTURE is not an instance of fake 
news. It is merely bad journalism. The documentarians, it appears, attempted to 
report the facts but failed to tell us all of them. Thus, they conveyed the false 
impression that acupuncture can be a powerful anaesthetic.
HANNITY: In May 2016, Sean Hannity of Fox News reported that Donald 
Trump once sent a private aircraft to help out 200 marines. These marines had 
come back from a military operation during the second Gulf War of 1991 and 
were waiting to be flown back home from Camp Lejeune in North Carolina. But 
their flights were delayed, and well- wishers back home had to wait for hours. 
Donald Trump allegedly heard about this and decided to help. So he diverted 
one of his aeroplanes to pick up the men. Except that he did not actually do that. 
According to The Fact Checker of the Washington Post, the story relied mainly on 
the recollection of a former marine, who reported being flown out from Camp 
Lejeune in a Trump jet. This part is true. However, it was not because Trump had 
graciously decided to help, which Hannity simply inferred. Instead, the “aircraft 
that ferried the troops was part of the Trump Shuttle fleet, at a time when Trump 
barely had control over the airline and was frantically trying to negotiate deals 
with bankers to prevent the collapse of his business empire” (Kessler 2016).
Intuitive Judgement: HANNITY also seems to be an instance of bad journal-
ism or, more specifically, biased journalism. Hannity is known for his favourable 
attitude towards Trump. It presumably led him to accept the story based on 
insufficient evidence.
THE ONION: In May 2015, The Onion reported that FIFA had just announced 
to hold yet another Soccer World Cup in the United States, which had already 
begun (The Onion 2015). If true, this would have been highly unusual because 
the FIFA World Cup is a quadrennial tournament that had already taken place 
the year prior in Brazil. Of course, the story was not serious. The Onion, after all, 
is a satire publication. It fabricated the tale in an attempt to poke fun at the FIFA 
organisation which, at the time, was drowning in corruption charges. In fact, it 
was evident that the story was a hoax. All of its parts appeared to be deliberately 
crafted to make it look utterly absurd.
Intuitive Judgement: THE ONION, I take it, does not strike us as fake news ei-
1. The documentary is still available at: https://youtu.be/D53UwyJWa3w (accessed July 31, 
2018).
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ther. It is satire. Unlike the BBC in ACUPUNCTURE or Sean Hannity in HANNI-
TY, the pranksters in THE ONION did not even try to get any story right. They 
just made it up. The sources cited were fictitious, and the details were not even 
based on rumours or hunches. This was obvious because the publication does 
not cover up the fact that the stories are fictitious.
PIZZAGATE: In early November 2016 (shortly before the 2016 US presiden-
tial election), 4chan2 users concocted an incredible conspiracy theory: Hillary 
Clinton and her campaign manager John Podesta were part of a child trafficking 
ring that was allegedly operating out of a pizzeria in Washington called Comet 
Ping Pong (LaCapria 2016). Users went through Hillary Clinton’s emails, which 
had famously been leaked by Wikileaks, and found James Alefantis among Po-
desta’s email contacts. Alefantis owned Comet Ping Pong and had previously 
organized an event there to support Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign. He 
posted a note Clinton had sent to thank him on his Instagram account. Alongside 
it, he also posted photos of children. 4chan users “connected the dots” and in-
ferred that Alefantis, Clinton, and Podesta must have been conspiring in a child 
trafficking ring. This unbelievable tale became known as “pizzagate.” Dubious 
websites began breaking the story. In November alone, almost a million mes-
sages using the hashtag #pizzagate circulated on Twitter.
Intuitive Judgement: PIZZAGATE seems to be the quintessential fake news 
story. It does not appear to be just a case of bad journalism because those who 
made it up did not, plausibly, try to get the story right.3 And it does not appear 
to be satire. Its details, after all, seemed to be designed to shock rather than to 
humour. Furthermore, the fictitiousness of the story was not evident.
2. Explaining the Difference
What can explain the difference between these cases?
Explanation 1: Fake news can be identified by its truth value.
Perhaps, a fake news story is simply a false news story.4 Though initially plausi-
ble, this suggestion does not stand up to scrutiny. All cases we considered in Sec-
tion 1 contain (or implicate) incorrect information, but only one of them strikes 
2. 4chan is an imageboard website, which has become notorious as the birthplace for outra-
geous web content.
3. This assumption may be questioned. I will consider alternative interpretations of the case— 
PIZZAGATE* and PIZZAGATE** — in Section 5 below.
4. At least some scholars think that the falsity of the information is, in one way or another, 
definitional of fake news (e.g., Allcott & Gentzkow 2017; Jaster & Lanius in press).
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us as a fake news story. Hence, the falsity of the information does not seem to 
be a sufficient condition for fake news. It does not seem necessary either. When 
a journalist fabricates a story that happens to be true, this, too, is, intuitively, a 
case of fake news if it was impossible for anybody to know that the story is true.5
Explanation 2: Fake news can be identified by its content.
Maybe fake news stories can be identified in terms of their content. PIZZAGATE, 
unlike the other cases, contains a conspiracy theory, viz. the idea that Hillary 
Clinton, John Podesta, and James Alefantis conspired in running a child traffick-
ing ring out of a Washington pizzeria. Hence, it may seem that fake news stories 
might be those that involve conspiracy theories. Nevertheless, it does not seem 
to be adequate for a simple reason: conspiracy theories can be warranted. For ex-
ample, the Watergate affaire involved an actual conspiracy (Keeley 1999). Stories 
that covered the affaire accurately and with journalistic integrity were not fake 
news stories even though they reported a conspiracy theory.
Explanation 3: Fake news can be identified by its source.
Another initially plausible attempt to analyse fake news puts its source at the 
centre. There are, we might argue, more or less credible news sources. The Cable 
News Network (CNN), for example, can be considered a reliable news source, 
while some dubious board on the internet is not. This explanation, however, 
does not seem to capture what fake news is either. It is at least conceivable that 
reputable news outlets participate in its propagation, too.6 And it is equally con-
ceivable that a dodgy source would publish a well- researched story that quali-
fies as news. So it appears the reputability of a media source is neither a neces-
sary nor a sufficient condition for fake news.
Explanation 4: Fake news can be identified by its distribution channels.
In the recent past, fake news stories were communicated almost exclusively 
through the internet and, more specifically, through social media websites, 
such as Facebook and Twitter. However, once more, we should not misidentify 
this empirical link for a conceptual connection. It is entirely conceivable that 
5. I discuss this kind of case in more detail in Section 5, where I address some objections to 
my account.
6. In fact, CNN arguably came at least quite close when they interviewed an alleged eye-
witness of the Munich Shooting of 2016. While police investigations of the incident were still in 
progress, they brought on a young woman who reported that the gunman yelled “Allahu Akbar” 
before he attacked his victims (Shoichet, Ellis, & Hanna 2016). This turned out to be a fabrication.
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fake news would be spread using more traditional means of mass communi-
cation, such as radio or newspaper. To mention only two examples, the Nazis 
disseminated their fake news through the radio (the so- called “Volksempfän-
ger”), and in 1782, Benjamin Franklin famously produced an entire fake issue 
of a newspaper— the Boston Independent Chronicle— in an attempt to sway peace 
negotiations with Britain (Mulford 2008). Furthermore, genuine news is dissemi-
nated through social media as well. Many newspapers and media companies 
have social media channels and use them to promote their stories.
Explanation 5: Fake news can be identified by the way in which it is presented.
On the fifth explanation, fake news stories are those that are carefully crafted to 
optimize for user engagement and to increase the likelihood that the stories will 
get clicked on, liked, and shared. This strategy is often pejoratively referred to 
as “clickbait,” which essentially means that the stories’ headlines and preview 
photos give just enough information to raise the user’s attention but not enough 
to satisfy their curiosity, thus maximizing the likelihood that users will click on 
them. However, though the clickbait strategy is indeed a typical feature of mod-
ern fake news stories, this characteristic is not unique to them and, hence, cannot 
be a sufficient condition for fake news. Due to economic demands, legitimate 
news outlets also depend on user engagement and thus resort to sensational-
ist presentations of their content to clickbait potential readers. Furthermore, the 
clickbait strategy appears not to be necessary since a fake news story that does 
not use clickbait seems not to be a contradiction in terms.
Explanation 6: Fake news can be identified by the intent of the publisher.
On the sixth explanation, the difference between a real news story and a fake 
news story is the intent that lies behind its publication. Arguably, legitimate jour-
nalists and media companies follow an ethos of truth- telling (Jacquette 2010). 
Though they do need to make money, sell advertisements, and break stories that 
excite their readers, they also aim to get the story right. In contrast, “fake news 
is completely made up and designed to deceive readers to maximize traffic and 
profit” (Hunt 2016), as Elle Hunt of The Guardian explains. Those who publish 
fake news are, it seems, indifferent to the truth. To be sure, this does not mean 
that they always make false claims. If it suits their purpose, publishers of fake 
news will, on occasion, deliberately sprinkle some truths on top of their stories, 
for example, to make them more credible.7 However, their knowledge that a 
7. The pizzagate story, e.g., contained many correct details. The restaurant Comet Ping Pong 
was real. So were the characters of the story. Furthermore, there was indeed a connection between 
Alefantis, Podesta, and Clinton.
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given story is false (or lack of knowledge that it is true) will not keep them from 
publishing it if they believe that doing this helps them, for example, to make 
money. Also, it appears that publishers of fake news seek to deceive us about 
their intent. Hence, it may be reasonable to regard fake news as being essentially 
characterized by two features: those who publish it are, it seems, indifferent to 
the truth, and they try to avoid letting us know this.8
These two features are, of course, the hallmark of Frankfurtian bullshit. As I 
have explained in the introduction, according to Frankfurt, bullshit is character-
ized, firstly, by an “indifference to how things really are” (2005: 34). This is not 
to say that what a bullshitter says is always false. It might well be true. Unlike a 
liar, however, who seeks to convince us that a given statement he believes to be 
false is true, a bullshitter does not care about whether his utterances are true. The 
same, it appears, applies to the publisher of fake news. Secondly, the bullshitter 
misrepresents “in a certain way . . . what he is up to” (Frankfurt 2005: 54). In like 
manner, the publisher of fake news misrepresents, it seems, what he is up to. It 
appears that he wants to hide his actual motives.
3. An Analysis of Fake News
It seems reasonable to suggest, then, that fake news is simply a species of Frank-
furtian bullshit, as the following analysis holds.9
Analysis
Fake news is bullshit asserted in the form of a news publication.
This analysis contains three conditions that, given what I have said so far, 
seem to be necessary and jointly sufficient for the concept of fake news to apply. 
8. At least some of the publishers of fake news explicitly acknowledge their indifference to 
the truth, as BBC journalist Emma Jane Kirby reports. She has interviewed a number of them in 
Veles— a town in Macedonia where many of the most influential fake news stories of the 2016 US 
presidential election originated. One of their publishers, a young man Kirby refers to as “Goran,” 
explains how he and other fake news producers feel about the US election. He responds that 
“Teenagers in our city don’t care how Americans vote. . . . They are only satisfied that they make 
money and can buy expensive clothes and drinks!” (Kirby 2016).
9. The idea that fake news might be a species of bullshit was, to my knowledge, first proposed 
by Pennycock and Rand (2017). However, these authors acknowledge that there are different types 
of bullshit and concede that they do not know to which kind of bullshit fake news belongs. Neither 
do they argue for their conjecture. The connection between bullshit and fake news is also noted by 
Dentith (2017), Goodin and Spiekerman (2018), and Rini (2017). None of these authors, however, 
argue for the connection in much detail.
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These are the Bullshit Condition (B), the Assertion Condition (A), and the Publi-
cation Condition (P). According to B, something qualifies as fake news only if it 
contains bullshit in the Frankfurtian sense.10 The publisher has to be indifferent 
to the truth (B1) and cover up this fact (B2).11 According to A, it is necessary for 
fake news that the bullshit contained in it is asserted, that is, not only derivable by 
conversational implicature. Frankfurt, in his original essay, does not distinguish 
between bullshit assertions and bullshit implicatures (Webber 2013). As we will 
see in Section 4, this is important, however, to account for the phenomenon of 
bullshit journalism. Finally, according to P, for something to be fake news it is 
necessary for it to be presented in the form of a news publication. That is, any 
bullshit uttered in private is not fake news. For a story to qualify as fake news, it 
has to be made available publicly, for example, in paper form, on the radio, on 
the internet, etc.
This analysis does at least two things that we should expect from it. Firstly, it 
matches our intuitions about how the four cases should be categorized. Second-
ly, it elucidates the difference between them. ACUPUNCTURE is not an instance 
of fake news because the dubious suggestion that acupuncture is a powerful 
anaesthetic was not explicitly asserted but only implicated. However, even if this 
claim had been asserted, the case would not qualify as a fake news story because, 
plausibly, the documentarians did at least try to get the story right.12
In contrast, Cases 2, 3, and 4 do contain explicit, problematic published as-
sertions. So conditions A and P are fulfilled here. However, condition B seems to 
be fulfilled only in one of the cases. To see this, consider, first, HANNITY, which 
10. The qualifier “Frankfurtian” is important here. On Frankfurt’s account, whether a given 
utterance is a piece of bullshit depends on the state of mind of the person uttering it. Note, how-
ever, that there are different conceptions of bullshit and that some of them regard bullshit as mind- 
independent (Cohen 2002). In addition, Carson (2009; 2010; 2016) has pointed out that there might 
be a category of evasive bullshit which Frankfurt’s conception fails to take into account.
11. As an anonymous reviewer for this journal has pointed out, the publisher of a story may 
or may not be its author. So why should we focus on the publisher’s intent rather than the au-
thor’s? This is a fair point. For the purpose of the present paper, I ignore this complication mainly 
for reasons of simplicity. That is, I assume that the publisher vouches for and controls the quality 
of the journalism of his or her publication. To me, this assumption is sufficient reason to focus on 
the publisher’s intent. In certain practical situations, however, authors may be in a position to de-
cide, unilaterally, whether a story of theirs gets published and in which form. In that case, plausi-
bly, the author’s intent should matter and not the intent of the passive publisher who is, as it were, 
“out of the loop.” In more complicated situations where more than one person decides whether or 
not a story sees the light of day, we should, plausibly, focus on collective intentions, as discussed, 
e.g., by Schweikard and Schmid (2013).
12. In previous presentations of my argument, I have been criticized for making this chari-
table assumption. I should, therefore, point out that, if my interpretation of ACUPUNCTURE is 
incorrect and the documentarians did not actually care about the truth, then their story could, of 
course, be regarded as containing bullshit implicatures and, ipso facto, as bullshit journalism. I 
will consider this case, ACUPUNCTURE*, in Section 4.
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is, intuitively, merely an instance of biased journalism. In this case, the journalist 
Sean Hannity did not get the story right because he did not dig deep enough or 
fell for the pitfalls of his cognitive psychology (or both). Nevertheless, he plau-
sibly aimed at the truth. This is supported, for example, by the fact that he did 
bring on a genuine eyewitness to back up his story. In other words, Hannity 
failed to exhibit condition B1. There was no indifference to the truth, no bullshit, 
and, hence, it seems, no fake news story.13
Consider, next, THE ONION, which is a satire story. The difference between 
satire and fake news does not lie in B1. The two are similar to the extent that both 
the satirist and the publisher of fake news do not aim to report the facts accu-
rately. They are, I shall assume, both indifferent to the truth and up to something 
else.14 The satirist seeks to ridicule, mock, parody, or caricature.15 To this end, 
he helps himself rather liberally to stylistic devices (e.g., hyperbole and provoca-
tion). He does this as it helps him to make his point more effectively.16 But, of 
course, this is not the best way to communicate information accurately. Hence, 
a satirist will tend to run the risk of misinforming his audience. In that regard, 
what he does is akin to what the publisher of fake news does. However, there 
still is an essential difference between the two regarding condition B2. Satirists 
usually do not cover up their motives— at least not systematically. This holds in 
the online sphere as well, as Gillin (2017) explains. Satire websites, he says, “may 
or may not make it clear on individual links that their stories are fake, but will 
almost always say in a disclaimer somewhere on their site that their content is 
exaggerated or fictional.” In contrast, the publisher of fake news keeps his cards 
13. Of course, the case of Hannity also lacked B2, which is entailed by the lack of B1. There 
cannot be an attempt to cover up that one is indifferent to the truth if one is not, in fact, indifferent 
to the truth. Also, the proviso I added in regards to ACUPUNCTURE (see Footnote 12) applies 
here as well. If, that is, Hannity was, contrary to my assumption, indifferent to the truth of the 
story, then HANNITY might also qualify as a fake news story.
14. This assumption may, of course, be criticized as expressing a naïve understanding of the 
nature of satire and of the relationship between satire and truth. The American comedian and poli-
tician Al Franken paints a different picture of that relationship. According to him, “What a satirist 
does is look at a situation, find the inconsistencies, hypocrisies, absurdities and cut through all the 
baloney and get to the truth” (quoted by Branham 2009: 139). Note, however, that the assumption 
that the satirist is not indifferent to the truth would lend further support to my argument because it 
would make for an even sharper contrast between satire and fake news. This is because, if satirists 
were not actually indifferent to the truth, satire would not even fulfil B1.
15. In fact, it is far from easy to tease apart the motives of online satirists. According to Gillin 
(2017), “They could be writing stories purely for entertainment, or they may be trolling a particular 
set of voters.”
16. An anonymous reviewer for this journal has pointed out that, as Davis (2017) has argued, 
literally false statements might still be useful for conveying information about the subject mat-
ter. A satirist may, e.g., ironically comment on a politician’s statement by saying: “Yes, and pigs 
can fly.” This is a deliberately false and absurd statement. However, it is not to be believed by 
the recipient. Rather, it is a stylistic device that is meant to draw attention to the absurdity of the 
politician’s utterance.
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close to his chest. As I pointed out above, he intends to fool readers into thinking 
that what he reports is actual news when, in fact, it may be entirely made up. 
Though, as I assume, the satirists in THE ONION were, like the publishers of 
fake news, indifferent to the truth, they were not disingenuous about that fact, 
while publishers of fake news are. The latter, in other words, exhibit both B1 and 
B2, while satirists fulfil only B1.
Finally, consider PIZZAGATE. The pizzagate story evidently fulfils both B1 
and B2. Firstly, those who published the story were arguably indifferent to the 
truth.17 They must have known, after all, that there was not a shred of credible 
evidence to support the allegation that Hillary Clinton was involved in a sex- 
trafficking ring. It was all made up. Secondly, these publishers were dishonest 
about that fact. Had they stated clearly that the story was merely a joke or wild 
speculation, many internet users would likely not have taken the bait. These two 
facts, it seems, are what makes pizzagate a fake news story.18
To sum up, the analysis I have proposed at the beginning of this section does 
quite a bit of work. It appears, firstly, to fit the four test cases, and it can explain, 
secondly, the intuitive difference between them. This, I believe, is not an arte-
fact of the chosen scenarios. Using a fact- checking website like Snopes, we can 
readily ascertain that the analysis correctly categorizes many further stories as 
fake news stories, while properly excluding others from that category.19 This, of 
course, does not mean that there are no possible objections to it. In Section 5, I 
shall discuss two criticisms that have previously been pointed out to me. Before 
that, however, I shall address some interpretative issues in the ensuing section.
17. This assumption may, of course, be questioned. That is why I will introduce two alternative 
interpretations in Section 5. In PIZZAGATE*, the publishers of the pizzagate story are assumed to be 
deluded enough to believe their own story. In PIZZAGATE**, we suppose that they are lying.
18. I mentioned in Footnote 16 that, as Davis (2017) has argued, literally false information 
can be an effective tool for expressing a genuine point. As an anonymous reviewer has pointed 
out, this might also apply to PIZZAGATE. In this case, it may not have been the aim of the pub-
lishers “to say anything literally true about Clinton at all but rather to express dislike for her as a 
candidate.” I do not believe, however, that this is likely in the case of PIZZAGATE. According to 
Silverman (2016b), the story was first put out in the form of a news publication by Adl- Tabatabai 
(2016). In his text, he compiles a number of sources that seem to implicate Clinton in the pedophile 
scandal. It appears evident that Adl- Tabatabai did not do this merely to express an unfavourable 
attitude towards her as a political candidate but, rather, to make readers believe the story.
19. Snopes articles usually provide enough circumstantial evidence for us to decide whether 
a given story was published with an indifference to the truth (B1) and with an intention to de-
ceive (B2). There is, e.g., clear evidence that both conditions are met in obvious examples of fake 
news stories like “FBI Agent Suspected in Hillary Email Leaks Found Dead in Apparent Murder- 
Suicide” (Mikkelson 2016) and “Creepy Clowns plan Halloween Night Purge, Cops warn ’Stay 
Inside’” (La Capria 2017). These stories were clearly made up, and their publishers tried to deceive 
us about that fact (as evidenced, e.g., by the lack of a disclaimer on their website). At the same time, 
some stories on Snopes do not, intuitively, deserve the label “fake news,” e.g. the story that Donald 
Trump had the bust of Martin Luther King removed from the Oval Office (Emery 2017). This was 
an honest reporting error, and there was, plausibly, no intention to deceive.
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4. Clarifications
In the previous section, I introduced my analysis of fake news and showed that 
it matches the four cases that I presented in Section 1. In the present section, I 
shall address some interpretative issues that concern conditions B (consisting of 
B1 and B2), A, and P.20
Bullshit Condition (B1)
On B1, the publisher of a fake news story is “indifferent to the truth.” Strictly 
speaking, this is loose talk. Indifference, after all, is a preference relation. Hence, 
though we often say that someone is “indifferent to something” (e.g., the truth), 
this turn of speech is, in fact, elliptical.21 When we meaningfully employ the 
concept of indifference, we say that someone is indifferent between at least two 
objects. So, rather than saying that someone who is truth- indifferent is indiffer-
ent to the truth, we should at least say that she is indifferent between truth and 
falsehood.
This way of putting it, however, is also problematic because truth and false-
hood do not exist independently of truth- bearers, for example, beliefs. So we 
should say, it seems, that one is truth- indifferent to the extent that one has, as 
Quassim Cassam has recently put it, “a casual lack of concern about whether 
one’s beliefs have any basis in reality” (Cassam in press) or not. Cassam calls 
this attitude “epistemic insouciance,” and it is, arguably, one important form of 
truth- indifference.
Epistemic insouciance, however, is not exactly what is required by B1. A per-
son who is indifferent to whether her beliefs are true or false could, after all, 
avoid bullshitting by never communicating them to others.22 Evidently, then, 
what matters here are not beliefs but communications.23 B1 requires indifference 
to whether one’s communications are true or false.24
Now, to say that a publisher is indifferent to whether his communications 
20. I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for this journal for pointing out to me that there 
are some interpretative issues that needed addressing.
21. Harry Frankfurt, e.g., uses the phrase “indifference to how things really are” (Frankfurt 
2005: 34).
22. Russell Hurlburt puts this insight more generally by observing that “[to] bullshit is an 
inter- personal act” (2011: 18).
23. Cassam, it seems, neglects this difference in his discussion of epistemic insouciance. At 
one point, he says that this attitude implies “an indifference to the truth or falsity of [the speaker’s] 
utterances” (Cassam in press; emphasis added). In another passage, then, he says that epistemic 
insouciance consists in a “lack of concern about whether one’s beliefs have any basis in reality” 
(Cassam in press; emphasis added).
24. Having clarified this, I suspect that the two forms of truth- indifference are closely related 
empirically. A person who is truth- indifferent about her beliefs and who tends to say what she 
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are true or false can mean different things. To see this, imagine a publisher who 
is considering publishing a story. He is doubtful about its truth. In one sense, 
then, he is truth- indifferent if he chooses to publish the story anyway. Let us re-
fer to this type of truth- indifference as “truth- indifference1.” Note, however, that 
our publisher might not be truth- indifferent in another sense. Suppose that he 
does consider his lack of conviction in the story’s truth as a reason for not pub-
lishing it but decides that, all things considered, it would be for the best to pub-
lish it anyway. In that case, there is a sense in which the publisher is not truth- 
indifferent— call it “truth- indifference2.” He recognizes, after all, that the truth or 
falsehood of a story is a factor to be taken into account. Now, there is yet another 
sense in which our publisher can be truth- indifferent. Suppose he decides not to 
publish any stories he is doubtful about, and suppose, further, that he does this 
because he considers the truth of a story an important factor. He is, then, not 
truth- indifferent1 or truth- indifferent2. He may, however, be truth- indifferent in 
a further sense— call it “truth- indifference3”— if he is only concerned with the 
truth of a story for instrumental reasons. A political regime might impose severe 
penalties for false reporting such that the publisher is forced to prioritize truth. 
He might, however, fail to see the intrinsic value of truth and would, if there 
were no penalties, not hesitate to publish any story whatsoever.
Which of these three notions of truth- indifference is relevant in the context of 
B1? The answer is obvious: A story is fake news only if its publisher chooses to 
publish it despite his doubts about its truth because this is, all things considered, 
preferable for him to do. This is truth- indifference1. It is irrelevant whether the 
publisher regards truth as a pro tanto reason for his decision (truth- indifference2), 
and it is equally irrelevant whether he thinks that a story’s truth matters intrinsi-
cally (truth- indifference3).25
To confirm this, consider PIZZAGATE again. I assumed that the publishers 
were truth- indifferent1. This feature is necessary because, had the publishers not 
been truth- indifferent1, there would not have been any fake news story to begin 
with since they would not have decided to publish it. Now, let us imagine that 
the publishers were not truth- indifferent2 and truth- indifferent3. That is, they 
were concerned about the fact that their story was likely false, and they also 
regarded truth as an intrinsically desirable feature in a story. However, they 
believes will, of course, frequently end up being truth- indifferent about her communications as 
well. In other words, epistemic insouciance will often lead to bullshit, as Cassam, of course, notes.
25. Frankfurt (2005) briefly discusses why an antirealist outlook might produce bullshit. In-
deed, if you “deny that we can have any reliable access to an objective reality” and “reject the pos-
sibility of knowing how things truly are” (Frankfurt 2005: 64), you will, it seems, adopt attitudes 
that are functionally equivalent to all three kinds of truth- indifference. You will dismiss the notion 
that you should, all things considered, publish a story only if it is true (truth- indifference1), that the 
truth of a story is a relevant consideration in deciding what to do with it (truth- indifference2), and 
that the truth of a story is an intrinsically important factor (truth- indifference3).
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decided to publish their story anyway because they judged that it was, all things 
considered, more important to fight (what they took to be) a reprehensible po-
litical candidate than to speak the truth. Adding these details evidently does not 
change our evaluation of the case. Even with these factors in the picture, PIZZA-
GATE remains, I believe, a paradigm case of fake news. To sum up, then, what is 
required by B1, that is, the truth- indifference condition for fake news, is that the 
story’s publisher decides to publish it despite there being doubts about its truth.
Bullshit Condition (B2)
The verb “to deceive” is an achievement word (Ryle 1949/2009: 131ff.), unlike, 
for example, “to lie”. I have not deceived you unless you actually come to believe 
something that I wanted you to believe. However, the intention to deceive does 
not require that effect. According to condition B2, the publisher is required to 
intend to deceive his audience. Whether he is successful in achieving this is im-
material.
That said, let us investigate the nature of the intention. As I have explained, 
a fake news publisher does not necessarily seek to deceive us about the facts. As 
a bullshitter, however, “What he does necessarily attempt to deceive us about 
is,” in Frankfurt’s words, “his enterprise.” He “misrepresents what he is up to” 
(Frankfurt 2005: 54). While he is, in fact, truth- indifferent (in the sense of truth- 
indifferent1), he tries to come across as someone who is concerned with the truth.
There are various ways to do this. One is to lie. The fake news publisher may, 
for example, provide false information about himself or his publication (e.g., in 
the “About Us” section of his website). Another method is to work with false 
implicatures, for example, by citing fake sources to create the impression that 
one pays heed to the evidence. These two examples, however, are not the only 
methods a publisher can use to deceive us about his intent. On the traditional 
definition of deception, “To deceive =df to intentionally cause to have a false be-
lief that is known or believed to be false”26 (Mahon 2016). Accordingly, a fake 
news publisher does not even have to say anything to deceive us about his enter-
prise. He can, for example, misrepresent what he is up to by having a misleading 
web address— one that “sounds legit”— or by mimicking website addresses and 
designs of acknowledged news sources.27 Finally, it is not even clear that a fake 
26. Note that the traditional definition of deception is associated with difficulties, as dis-
cussed by Mahon (2016). I use it, rather than more complex proposals, to sidestep issues that I take 
to be irrelevant to the present discussion.
27. Many examples illustrate this strategy. The hoax that George H. W. Bush had died in 2017 
was, e.g., distributed through websites with names like “TV- CNN.com” and “Fox- Channel.com,” 
which mimicked the web addresses of the well- known TV channels CNN and Fox News (Evon 
2017). In addition, there have been fake news sites named “Breaking- CNN.com,” “Fox- Channel.
com,” “NBCNews.com.co,” and so on.
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news publisher needs to do anything to deceive his audience. If he purposely 
refrains, for example, from putting up a disclaimer on his website which states 
that his stories are fictitious, this, too, is, arguably, intentionally deceptive.
To sum up, B2 does not require that the publisher is successful in deceiving 
anyone. It does, however, require that he try. As we have seen, there are various 
things he can do to this end. He can lie, mislead, or refrain from accurately clas-
sifying the information provided.
Assertion Condition (A)
It may seem at first glance as though my analysis implies that any bullshit in the 
form of a news publication has to be classed as fake news. This consequence, a 
critic might argue, is unwelcome. We should, after all, allow for the category of 
bullshit journalism. Intuitively, at least, there should be such a category because in 
some cases, we would probably go so far as to call some bad and biased journal-
ism “bullshit,” without going so far as to call it “fake news.”
This concern can be answered by distinguishing between bullshit assertions 
and bullshit implicatures (Webber 2013). When somebody asserts bullshit, they 
are indifferent regarding the truth of their statements. In contrast, when some-
body implicates bullshit, they are indifferent to the truth of the implicatures of 
their statements.28 Note, however, that, on A, it is a necessary condition for fake 
news that the bullshit content is asserted rather than merely implicated. Thus, it 
makes room for the category of bullshit journalism. If journalists assert bullshit 
in their publications, then, I propose, they should be seen as peddling fake news. 
If, in contrast, they merely implicate it, they should be viewed as practising 
bullshit journalism.
To illustrate, consider a variation of ACUPUNCTURE from Section 1— call 
it ACUPUNCTURE*. In this case, let us assume, the documentarians were hell- 
bent on avoiding false assertions but entirely indifferent about misleading their 
audience through conversational implicatures. They omitted important facts 
and did not care whether or not their story created a false impression. In this 
case, there is, by stipulation, still no bullshit assertion. Hence, it is still not a case 
of fake news. However, the documentarians were, as we assumed, indifferent 
to the truth of the implicatures that their audience might draw from their work. 
That means that there is now a bullshit implicature such that the case qualifies 
as an instance of bullshit journalism. Hence, as ACUPUNCTURE* illustrates, 
28. There are various ways in which journalists can implicate bullshit without asserting 
it. They can, e.g., report only the arguments on one side of an issue while neglecting counter- 
arguments. Due to the Gricean maxim of quantity (Grice 1989), which demands that they give all 
relevant information, they can thereby implicate that the issue is an open- and- shut case though it 
might not be.
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my analysis does, in fact, allow for cases that fall into the category of bullshit 
journalism without falling into the category of fake news. This is ensured by 
Condition A.
Publication Condition (P)
Finally, consider P. It states that a story has to be presented in the form of a 
news publication to qualify as fake news. What does this mean, however? One ap-
proach to clarifying this is to compile a list of possible distribution channels for 
news publications— for example, newspapers, news programmes (on television 
and radio), news websites— and to say that anybody who spreads bullshit asser-
tions using these distribution channels spreads fake news. Social media websites 
make things more complicated, however, because it is not always clear when 
assertions on social media accounts have the form of a news publication. Some 
certainly do. For example, when a CNN employee posts a story on CNN’s Twit-
ter account, this story is clearly presented in the form of a news publication. In 
contrast, when I share something on my Twitter account (that has five and a half 
followers), this, certainly, does not have the form of a news publication. That 
said, there are evidently borderline cases. If, for example, a CNN journalist posts 
a story to a private social media account that has a substantial following, it is not 
entirely clear whether this story is presented in the form of a news publication. 
At any rate, this is not clear to me. Hence, there is at least some degree of vague-
ness in the analysis I propose. To an analytically- minded person, this may seem 
like a problem. I believe, however, that it is not a fair point of criticism when 
used against my analysis of fake news. After all, fake news is like news, except 
fake. Accordingly, the concept of fake news has to be at least as vague as the con-
cept of news. This is not to say, of course, that all objections to my analysis can 
be dispensed with so easily. Some deserve closer attention. In the next section, I 
will turn to some of them.
5. Objections
Any conceptual analysis may fail in one of two ways. It may, firstly, be overin-
clusive and, secondly, overexclusive. That is, it may include cases that it should 
exclude and exclude cases that it should include. Accordingly, there are two 
types of criticism a critic may level against the analysis of fake news that I have 
proposed. Though I cannot address all possible instantiations of the two types of 
criticism, I will discuss specific forms of them that strike me as important.
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Objection 1: The analysis is overinclusive.
Consider a concrete version of Objection 1. To this end, imagine a journalist who 
publishes a story that is entirely correct in all its details. However, this is not be-
cause she researched it carefully. Instead, she simply wanted to write an exciting 
story to generate many clicks. So she wrote it down without any concern for the 
truth but, by a freakish coincidence, got everything right. What she published is, 
then, Franfurtian bullshit asserted in the form of a news publication. However, a 
critic may insist that this is, intuitively, not an instance of fake news.
There are three ways to deal with this case. The first is to deny that it is not, 
intuitively, an instance of a fake news story. I believe that once we carefully con-
sider the details of the scenario, it becomes clear that the story the journalist re-
ports is fake news. After all, she did not attempt to do what constitutes genuine 
newsmaking. She did not do any research, interview witnesses, or consult with 
experts. In other words, she did nothing that bears even a remote resemblance 
to what a genuine newsmaker does. To that extent, her purported news story is 
clearly fake. The fact that it happens to be entirely accurate does not, intuitively, 
detract from its fakeness.29
The second way to address the objection is to accept, for argument’s sake, 
that the idea of true fake news is genuinely counter- intuitive but to argue that 
the intuition in question is based on a cognitive error and should, hence, be dis-
missed. In the present case, there are two reasons for suspecting that this might 
be so. Firstly, the line between fake and genuine news is especially thin here. 
Accordingly, it might be easy to overlook it. After all, not much is missing from 
the fake news story for it to become a genuine news story. It only takes one 
fact- checker who looks into it with proper regard for its truth and re- publishes 
it. This would make the story a genuine news story. Secondly, the hesitation to 
categorize a true piece of information as fake news might be explained by a cog-
nitive bias, specifically the hindsight bias. It is known that people tend to perceive 
an event as more predictable once it has occurred— that is, in hindsight— than 
before it has happened.30 As Levy (2016) explains, “This perception could me-
diate inferences about the likely state of mind of an agent.” In the present case 
where a fabricated news story turns out to be true by coincidence, those who 
intuit that it is not an instance of fake news may misjudge the state of mind of 
29. Frankfurt draws our attention to the same distinction in the context of his discussion of 
bullshit. “[O]ne must recognize,” he says, “that a fake or a phony need not be in any respect (apart 
from authenticity itself) inferior to the real thing” (Frankfurt 2005: 47). In other words, a proposi-
tion which was produced with no regard for the truth may still happen to be true. In like man-
ner, a purported news publication that was produced with no regard for the truth— a fake news 
publication— may also be entirely true.
30. For a thorough literature review, see Roes and Vohs (2012).
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the publisher. They may assume, contrary to the stipulations, that the publisher 
must have been to some degree warranted in reporting this story and that it 
was, hence, not fake news. To be sure, these are both armchair speculations that 
should be tested empirically.
The third reply is to present the analysis as a contribution to normative con-
ceptual engineering rather than an attempt to capture intuitions descriptively.31 
Viewing it through this lens might be useful should it turn out not to capture 
our (trustworthy) intuitions sufficiently well. An argument to that effect would 
have to show that the proposed analysis fulfils certain normative criteria to a 
higher degree than the common- sense concept.32 At this point, I cannot provide 
a detailed discussion of how such an argument might proceed. After all, survey-
ing the conceptual engineering literature would take us too far afield, and sys-
tematic empirical research into the common- sense concept of fake news seems 
to be practically non- existent. Accordingly, we cannot compare the properties of 
the two concepts in any detail. However, I suspect that my analysis would do 
rather well in comparison to what the common- sense concept turns out to be. 
This is because it has some desirable features, as we can ascertain, for example, 
by applying Rudolf Carnap’s criteria for the adequate explication of a concept 
(Carnap 1950/1962). According to these criteria, there should, firstly, be a suf-
ficient similarity between the explicandum (i.e., the common- sense concept) and 
the proposed explicatum (i.e., the engineered concept) such that “most of what 
previously was said with the former can now be said with the help of the lat-
ter” (Carnap 1950/1962: 6). As far as I can see, this is evidently the case since 
the analysis captures, as we have seen, most, if not all, of the intuitions that 
common- sense provides. It should, secondly, be sufficiently exact. This seems to 
be the case as well. At any rate, the analysis is exact to the extent that the notions 
of bullshit, assertion, and news publication are exact. The first two are estab-
lished concepts in philosophical discourse, and the third, though it may involve 
some degree of indeterminacy, is an everyday concept that does not appear to 
be especially problematic. Thirdly, the explication should be fruitful. To Carnap, 
this meant that the explicatum should be “useful for the formulation of many 
universal statements (empirical laws in the case of a nonlogical concept, logical 
theorems in the case of a logical concept)” (Carnap 1950/1962: 7). However, what 
this criterion reasonably requires varies, arguably, depending on the context 
(Machery 2017). I suspect that the analysis I have proposed will be fruitful for 
two reasons. Firstly, it should allow us to draw insights about fake news from 
the general study of bullshit and, secondly, because it may permit us to gener-
31. An anonymous reviewer for this journal has suggested this strategy to me.
32. For recent book- long treatments of conceptual engineering that also address the norma-
tive criteria for the adequacy of an engineered concept, see Cappelen (2018) and Burgess, Cap-
pelen, and Plunkett (in press).
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ate interesting hypotheses by relying on analogies between the phenomenon of 
fake news and other areas where bullshit is arguably a problem, for example, 
pseudoscience (Ladyman 2013). Fourthly and finally, an explicatum should, ac-
cording to Carnap (1950/1962), be simple (though he intends this criterion only 
as a tie- breaker). This criterion, I think, speaks for itself in the present case. I have 
a hard time imagining a more straightforward analysis of fake news that is also 
sufficiently true to the other three criteria that Carnap proposed.
Objection 2: The analysis is overexclusive.
According to the second objection, the analysis is overexclusive, that is, it ex-
cludes cases which it should, intuitively, count as instances of fake news. One 
such example that critics have suggested to me is the following: Imagine a varia-
tion of PIZZAGATE. Call it PIZZAGATE*. Its details are the same as in the origi-
nal case except that the publishers of the pizzagate conspiracy theory were not 
indifferent to the truth. Rather, they aimed at reporting a true story. However, 
their thinking followed what may be called a “crippled epistemology” (Sunstein 
and Vermeule 2009), which should, I take it, be interpreted as meaning that it 
relies on ways of reasoning that are significantly biased, fallacious, and irratio-
nal.33 Now, it seems that PIZZAGATE* is still a case of fake news. However, 
the bullshit condition appears not to be fulfilled because the publishers are not 
indifferent to the truth. This, in turn, suggests that my analysis of fake news is 
overexclusive.
The objection is important, I believe, because it shows that we need to tweak 
the bullshit conditions, B1 and B2. Ladyman (2013), who discusses the analogy 
between bullshit and pseudoscience, has developed an approach for doing this. 
As he notes, this analogy is prima vista problematic because “we usually as-
sume that bullshitters know what they are doing,” while “pseudoscientists are 
apparently genuinely seeking truth” (Ladyman 2013: 52). Ladyman answers this 
concern by pointing out that “one can bullshit unwittingly” and that “pseudo-
science is often akin to that” (2013: 52). As he goes on to explain, “Just because 
one’s first- order self- representations are that one is sincerely seeking the truth,” 
one might, “in a deeper sense,” “not care about it because one does not heed to 
the evidence” (Ladyman 2013: 52). On Ladyman’s interpretation, then, truth- 
33. Here I depart from the meaning of “crippled epistemology” that Sunstein and Vermeule 
(2009) intend. To them, a person has a crippled epistemology if “they know very few things, and 
what they know is wrong” (Sunstein and Vermeule 2009: 10). I believe that this interpretation is 
problematic for at least two reasons. Firstly, it is not even coherent since one cannot know things 
that are wrong. Secondly, we should, I believe, distinguish between a rational or irrational episte-
mology, as the case may be, and the deliverances of that epistemology, i.e., the beliefs the person 
following it develops. Accordingly, it seems preferable to me to interpret the term “crippled episte-
mology” as referring to a way of reasoning which is significantly biased, fallacious, and irrational.
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indifference (B1) and the intention to deceive (B2) are still the essential core of 
bullshit. However, the attitude of indifference need not be a conscious one. Rath-
er, it can be located at a deeper level of the agent’s psychology. Furthermore, 
the idea of deception is extended such that it also covers self- deception.34 Lady-
man’s modified, broad understanding of Frankfurtian bullshit can, hence, help 
us to accommodate cases like PIZZAGATE* which may, intuitively, be viewed 
as cases of fake news.
Now consider another variation of PIZZAGATE— call it PIZZAGATE**. 
Again, let us stipulate that all details are the same as in PIZZAGATE, except 
that the publishers of the story had a different motive. Suppose they knew that 
the story was untrue but published it anyway because they wanted to spread a 
lie. Intuitively, it may be argued, PIZZAGATE** also strikes us as a case of fake 
news. However, it does not seem to be a case of Frankfurtian bullshit but a case 
of lying.
At first glance, this objection can easily be countered because lying and 
bullshit are not exclusive categories. As Frankfurt explains, to bullshit is to make 
assertions “without paying attention to anything except what it suits one to say” 
(Frankfurt 2005: 60). A bullshitter may happen to know that a given assertion 
is false but choose not to pay attention to that fact since he is indifferent to the 
truth. In that case, he is not only a bullshitter. On the standard definition of lying, 
he is also a liar because he asserts something he knows to be false. Accordingly, 
PIZZAGATE**, it seems, can be construed as a case of Frankfurtian bullshit, too.
Note, however, that this is not the only possible interpretation. Instead, we 
may stipulate that the publisher does pay attention to things other than what it 
suits him to say. Suppose the only thing he cares about is to express a falsehood. 
In St. Augustine’s words, he lies “from the sheer joy of lying” (Augustine 2002: 
108).35 On this interpretation, PIZZAGATE** still seems to involve an instance of 
fake news. However, since the publisher is not indifferent to the truth, there is no 
Frankfurtian bullshit. Rather, this is a case of what may be called “pure lying.” 
Hence, PIZZAGATE** cannot be construed as involving an instance of Frankfur-
tian bullshit. Accordingly, I have to make a concession here. I have to make a dis-
tinction between two types of fake news, viz. the bullshit type (e.g., PIZZAGATE 
and PIZZAGATE*) and the pure lying type (e.g., PIZZAGATE**). Furthermore, I 
have to restrict the analysis I have proposed to the first type.
That said, I do not believe the concession makes a practical difference be-
cause the pure lying type of fake news does not seem to play any role in prac-
tice. This gets clear once we consider the motivations for spreading fake news. 
34. For reasons of space, I shall not discuss the notion of self- deception here. See Deweese- 
Boyd (2017), for an instructive discussion.
35. According to St. Augustin, there are eight types of lies. PIZZAGATE** involves the fourth 
type where the liar does not tell the lie for instrumental reasons but for its own sake.
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Generally, there is either an ideological or a pecuniary motive (Allcott & Gentzkow 
2017). That is, publishers of fake news either seek to convince us of a particular 
political viewpoint, or they try to make money through advertisements. To ac-
complish these goals, they will say anything— whether true or false. There are, 
as far as I can see, practically no empirical exceptions.36 Accordingly, I suspect 
that the pure lying type of fake news does not occur in practice and that my 
analysis covers all real cases. I, therefore, submit that we should, for all practical 
purposes, understand fake news as a version of Frankfurtian bullshit, construed 
suitably broadly (following Ladyman 2013), which is asserted in the form of a 
news publication.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, I investigated the concept of fake news and proposed to analyse it 
as Frankfurtian bullshit asserted in the form of a news publication. In Section 1, 
I began with four cases that a satisfactory analysis should categorize correctly. 
After that, in Section 2, I considered some factors that might explain the differ-
ence between fake news and related phenomena. In Section 3, I proposed an 
analysis which I clarified in Section 4 and defended against two forms of objec-
tions in Section 5. One counter- example, however, prompted me to concede that 
my analysis only applies to the bullshit type of fake news and not to the pure 
lying type. As I explained, however, the latter type does not seem to occur in the 
real world such that my analysis should cover all practical cases of fake news.
If correct, my analysis will, I hope, help us to think more clearly about fake 
news when we investigate the phenomenon further. The most important and in-
teresting question is, I believe, a practical one: What, if anything, should we do 
about fake news? Is it a problem sui generis, or is it, instead, a symptom of an 
underlying problem? At first glance, the answers to these questions may seem 
self- evident. We know, for example, that fake stories in favour of Donald Trump 
out- numbered the fake stories in support of Hillary Clinton by a substantial mar-
gin (Silverman 2016a). It is natural to suggest, therefore, that Trump’s win was at 
least partly caused by fake stories favouring him. More generally, it seems reason-
able to suppose that fake news stories can have a substantial impact on election 
outcomes. However, there is a different explanation based on well- established 
36. One possible exception is the case of Paul Horner— an infamous fake news publisher. He 
claimed in one of his stories that a protester at a Trump rally admitted to having received 3,500$. 
When asked for his motive, he replied that he “wanted to make fun of that insane belief” (Dewey 
2016). Though this case might, at first glance, look more like a case of pure lying, it is not. Horner, 
after all, did not lie purely for lying’s sake but in order to mock the gullibility of Trump supporters. 
In addition to that, however, he made a fair amount of money through ad revenues.
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findings in political psychology which suggests that voter preferences can ex-
plain the success of fake news stories. Trump supporters, it may be argued, were 
susceptible to fake stories because they confirmed their beliefs. On that account, 
the fundamental problem is not that fake news affected the election results but 
that voters will believe anything so long as it meshes with their political outlook. 
In that case, fake news is merely a symptom of a larger problem, viz. voters’ 
tendency to look for information that confirms their prior beliefs (Lodge & Taber 
2013).37 I suspect that the causality goes both ways and that the proliferation of 
fake news, rather than being merely the effect of underlying psychological dis-
positions, can generate ethically relevant problems of its own.38 Of course, I am 
unable to make a case for this hypothesis here. It is clear that more research needs 
to be done to gauge how large an effect fake news really has, how significant a 
problem it really poses, and what, if any, we should do about it.
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